Abstract. Local-scale government ordinances that attempt to delay or displace oil and gas drilling in their territories are common in regions with hydrocarbon extraction activities. Drawing on literature from policy mobilities and resource and energy governance, this paper analyzes policymaking processes that resulted in a December 2013 ordinance in Dallas, Texas, which established a 1500 foot (457.2 meter) setback between gas wells and residences, making drilling (with hydraulic fracturing) nearly impossible. Dallas was not the first city in the region to adopt an oil and gas drilling ordinance; indeed, many regulatory provisions were copied from other regional cities. This paper explains policy mobility in the Dallas policymaking process in terms of anti-political practices and hydrocarbon institutions that, overall, determine neoliberal hydrocarbon governance. City governments cede some of the political process to gas drilling task forces that work to render setbacks technical. Legal classification of subsurface hydrocarbons as the mineral estate creates a legal gray area that confounds municipal regulatory authority and gives discursive power to mineral owners to threaten municipal officials with lawsuits. Both of these anti-political strategies encouraged selective copying and morphing of other policy provisions by the Dallas city government. Adopting longer municipal setback distance regulations represents a type of contestation of neoliberalism situated between complete deregulation and overt opposition.
Introduction
Big oil's political-economic power and the ascendency of neoliberalism applied to hydrocarbon resources reached an apex during George W. Bush's presidency (2001 Bush's presidency ( -2009 . Bush brought to the White House the political ideologies and hydrocarbon governance strategies of his home state, Texas, where a concurrent 'economic miracle' attributed to the state's embrace of freemarket principles, limited environmental regulations, and booming hydrocarbon sector enabled its ascension to a top global producer. However, in 2010, the Deepwater Horizon disaster showed the consequences of lax regulations and cozy relations between the state and hydrocarbon firms, what Watts (2012: 459) has called the "neoliberalization of the Gulf." That same year, Bush settled into retirement in Dallas, TX, where, in an ironic twist, a backlash against unconventional gas extraction, by hydraulic fracturing ('fracking') of hydrocarbon-bearing shale, was occurring. In 2013, Dallas enacted one of the nation's strictest oil and gas drilling regulations. So restrictive was the city's ordinance, that one elected official thought it made more sense to "write a oneline ordinance that says there will be no gas drilling in the City" than implement the 93-page document (City of Dallas, 2014a) . Given the state's reputation as a neoliberal hydrocarbon utopia, partly through the iconic television drama Dallas about oilman J.R. Ewing, but mainly through lax hydrocarbon regulations and cozy state-firm relations (Davis, 2014 : Rahm, 2011 , Dallas offers an intriguing case to investigate policymaking for hydrocarbon governance. Here we analyze the Dallas ordinance evolution in terms of policy mobilities literature and then explain observed policy mutation using theories of anti-politics and hydrocarbon institutions to arrive at conclusions regarding hydrocarbon governance more broadly. The paper's first goal is to contribute to policy mobility scholarship by using the development of the 2013 Dallas gas drilling ordinance, particularly its setback distance, to identify the role of outside regulations, key actors, discursive paradigms, and dominant models from nearby municipalities. Policy mobilities research focuses on fast-moving, neoliberal policies that mutate from one site to another . The relationships among regulatory policies in regions where neoliberal governance predominates are less clear in the policy mobilities literature. Setback distances between gas wells and residences, schools, and churches are contentious regulatory issues in urban and suburban settings. Long setbacks can limit capital accumulation by firms and mineral property owners, while shorter setbacks may generate citizen backlash that elected officials seek to avoid.
Our second goal is to explain why drilling policies become mobile. Anti-political strategies and practices, and hydrocarbon institutions are mutually reinforcing imperatives that produce urban hydrocarbon governance. The legal and institutional designation of a mineral property estate and the use of task forces support rapid and selective copying of municipal drilling regulations. Subsurface hydrocarbons, under Texas law, are open to private ownership as part of a mineral estate that may be separately owned from the surface estate. Threats of regulatory takings lawsuits, in which the mineral estate's owner or lessee alleges that a government regulation unconstitutionally impedes access to subsurface resources (Riley, 2007) , were persistent and often implicit components of the Dallas ordinance deliberations. Task forces work to render setback distances technical. Both of these anti-political strategies affect how cities govern and regulate fracking, and by conceptualizing setbacks in terms of contesting neoliberalism, we arrive at our third goal: to add theoretical depth and empirical detail to scholarship on hydrocarbon governance under neoliberalism.
The paper begins by reviewing policy mobilities and resource and energy governance scholarship. This is followed by background information on hydrocarbon governance in Texas and municipal responses to urban drilling. We present our results as a narrative of the Dallas policymaking process and reference claims, or quasi-hypotheses, from policy mobilities literature throughout. To give empirical traction to policy mobility claims, we follow fingerprints of other ordinances in the Dallas policy negotiations and ordinance. We also draw on semi-structured interviews with regional municipal authorities, over 100 h of audio and video recordings from Dallas council meetings, online city documents, and media reports. We then analyze the role of task forces, the mineral property estate and anti-politics in urban hydrocarbon governance, and argue that setbacks represent forms of contesting neoliberalism (Leitner et al., 2007) , in that policy actors struggle over determining the proper setback for particular municipalities. Our study finds that policy mobilities offer a useful framework for analyzing the development of hydrocarbon regulations. The institutional and judicial separation of mineral and surface estates, however, will remain a dominant factor in hydrocarbon governance throughout the USA, forcing policymakers to find 'technical' solutions as they navigate between concerned citizens and the accumulation imperatives of mineral property owners and hydrocarbon firms.
Explaining hydrocarbon governance processes and outcomes
Our theoretical claims are located at the intersection of policy mobilities literature, which mainly focuses on urban or national-scale policy development, and hydrocarbon governance literature that under-analyzes municipal-scale governance processes. Municipallevel hydrocarbon governance, seen as a process and outcome, includes determination of a setback distance as a specific policy (among many others) resulting from fluid and dynamic interactions among policy mobilities, anti-politics, and hydrocarbon institutions. Policy mobility is a product of particular forms of hydrocarbon governance and may be absent in other sites of hydrocarbon production, where, because of differing institutions and political culture, other emergent phenomena may be present. According to the mobilities literature, policies mutate and morph across political boundaries, pushed along by experts and selectively appropriated by policymakers . Policy mobility may be pronounced in unconventional hydrocarbon governance because of the many details relating to the complex drilling and hydraulic fracturing process (Chew, 2014) , in addition to the considerable transport, health, and environmental concerns (Hill, 2013; Jackson et al., 2014) , all of which create formidable challenges for policymakers. For this reason, municipal governments, often strapped for personnel and expertise, are likely to copy and morph policy provisions and unlikely to create unique hydrocarbon regulations.
In addition, the potential for massive accumulation from hydrocarbons puts high pressure on public officials, who seek to de-politicize decisions that carry sizeable financial implications. Anti-politics represent those strategies and practices by which 'technical' criteria substitute for political choices (Clarke, 2015; Li, 2007) . Although originally developed to critique international development policies, anti-politics are used by municipal governments to avoid public confrontation and debate (e.g. Clarke, 2015) . Moreover, unique institutional aspects of US hydrocarbons-subsurface oil and gas minerals may be privately owned and legally separated from surface ownership-create enormously different benefits and burdens between subsurface and surface owners (Fry et al., 2015) . To cope with these conflicting and shifting demands, policymakers select and morph policies from surrounding cities, which they characterize as 'technical' as they navigate the complicated legal terrain created by hydrocarbon institutions like the mineral estate. Interactions among policy mobilities, anti-politics, and hydrocarbon institutions, in turn, result in policy shifts that satisfy neither demands of hydrocarbon firms nor drilling-oppositional groups, highlighting the "reciprocal interdependence of neoliberalization and contestation" (Leitner et al., 2007: 14) , whereby the precise locus between neoliberalization and contestation at any given time results from particular conditions of the hydrocarbon resource, including its economic value, and the political success of the arguments marshalled by various stakeholders.
Recent scholarship on mobilized, mutated, and assembled policies argues that policies rarely travel intact across an inert institutional landscape (McCann and Ward, 2013) . Transnational neoliberal policymaking is a socially constructed process, in that policies evolve during their journeys . According to this growing literature, the decisions of politically motivated policymakers are not only rooted in local institutions and settings, but also incorporate entrepreneurial, 'expert' knowledge (Peck, 2011) , power structures , and selectively chosen elements of policies from elsewhere (Cook, 2008) .
To date, policy mobility studies in geography and planning have followed fast moving, neoliberal policies through globalizing networks and across transnational jurisdictional spaces (Harris and Moore, 2013) . Urban policy mobility case studies tend to focus on core cities, favored models, and 'hot' policy ideas (McCann, 2011) . Less clear is whether regionally specific municipal policies follow similarly mobilized and mutated trajectories. Indeed, few policy mobility studies venture below the international scale, obscuring whether mobility processes occur at sub-national, sub-state, or sub-regional scales. Moreover, little is known about the diverse nature of hydrocarbon governance at a regional or meso scale, including the dynamic struggles between municipal and state authority, tensions arising from separate surface and mineral estates, and conflicts regarding government and private ownership.
Our application of policy mobilities to the Dallas case also contributes to the growing body of scholarship on resource and energy governance. Governance involves institutional structures, legal frameworks, policies and regulations, social practices, and industry narratives that structure decisions about access, production, and control (Bridge and Perreault, 2009 ). Geographical scholarship on hydrocarbon governance predominantly focuses on the global market (Bradshaw, 2010; Bridge and Le Billon, 2013) and states (Perreault, 2013; Watts, 2012) . Processes leading to legal and regulatory structures that enable or constrain hydrocarbon extraction receives less attention (Andrews and McCarthy, 2014) than renewables (Kedron and Bagchi-Sen, 2011; Mulvaney, 2014) , although some scholars have begun to examine hydrocarbon governance practices within advanced neoliberal states (Hudgins and Poole, 2014) .
Our analysis assumes that neoliberal practices, regulatory experimentation, and contestation are inherent to hydrocarbon governance, including urban gas drilling. How hydrocarbon governance under neoliberalism is made manifest at the local level is not well understood, even though municipalities are at the forefront of neoliberal experimentation (Peck and Tickell, 2002) . Indeed, Texas cities are important sites for hydrocarbon policies (Fry, 2013) , and although Davis (2014) points to the Dallas gas drilling ordinance as an example of home-rule powers, the underlying processes, policies, practices, institutional structures, and legal frameworks that comprise neoliberal hydrocarbon governance in Dallas and elsewhere remain unclear. We follow the view that neoliberalization and its contestation produce coevolving spatiotemporal and sociopolitical aspects that ultimately reshape neoliberal governance strategies (Leitner et al., 2007) .
State and municipal shale gas regulations in Texas
A lucrative unconventional hydrocarbon resource base, the Barnett Shale, underlies the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan region (DFW; Figure 1 ; Fry, 2013) . The Barnett accounted for ~66% of US shale gas production between 2000 (EIA, 2011 . The combination of fracking, horizontal drilling, and high natural gas prices caused the number of Barnett wells to increase from 2616 in 2003 to ~17,000 in 2013 ~17,000 in (EIA, 2013 . Operators generally target the northeastern region of the deposit at 2.0-2.6 km depths (Johnston, 2004) . This 'sweet spot' also underlies much of DFW, but only part of Dallas (Figure 1 ). While the Barnett's physical geology and geochemistry determine where operators target, the rate and extent of extraction and location of gas wells are largely functions of governance processes in DFW municipalities.
The regulation of hydrocarbons in Texas appears one dimensional because the Railroad Commission of Texas (RRC) is the state agency tasked with virtually all regulatory authority over oil and gas. Yet, there is also a 'regulatory tangle' in Texas resulting from "fragmentation of the regulatory bureaucracy, a fundamental anti-regulatory disposition, and a well-entrenched legal and administrative structure that promotes oil and gas extraction above other concerns" (Rahm, 2011 (Rahm, : 2978 . Indeed, anti-regulation discourse and practice characterize the RRC, which is notorious for its revolving door relationship with the oil and gas industry (Prindle, 1981) .
Property ownership in Texas, and the entire territorial USA, is vertically divided into surface and mineral estates that may be owned and leased by private individuals or firms. Texas law gives dominant status to the oil and gas mineral estate over the surface estate because in situations of severed ownership, the mineral owner or lessee requires access to the surface estate for oil or gas extraction; without surface access, the value of subsurface minerals would be significantly diminished (Riley, 2007) . But the mineral estate's dominance is not absolute, because state and municipal governments can regulate private property use to protect public health and safety. For cities, this includes some power to restrict private mineral property rights with municipal drilling ordinances (Welch, 2013) , and it is here that contradictions and conflicts over government authority to regulate hydrocarbons arise.
First, a municipal drilling ordinance not substantially related to public health, safety, general welfare or one that is unreasonable or arbitrary could be ruled a compensatory regulatory takings of private property (Riley, 2007) . Regulatory takings occur when a government regulation "denies the landowner all economically viable use of the property or totally destroys the value of the property" (Welch, 2012: 2) . Mineral owners or lessees could challenge municipal authority on the basis that their 'property' was 'taken' by an arbitrary or unreasonable regulation. A second contentious point is the degree to which municipalities can regulate hydrocarbons. For example, Riley (2007) contends that the RRC maintains authority over the mineral estate but, inside municipal territory, the RRC cedes surface estate regulatory authority to municipal governments (Riley, 2007) . Although Texas passed a law in June 2015 restricting the ability of municipalities to regulate subsurface activities, cities can still regulate some surface activities.
(1) Setbacks are the most salient aspect of their regulatory toolkit (Welch, 2013) .
Among the ~200 municipalities overlying the Barnett, about half are within DFW. Nearly 60 DFW municipalities have gas well setback distances in effect in 2015. No scientific consensus exists on 'safe' distances for unconventional drilling activities (Fry, 2013; Schonkoff et al., 2014) . Without technical standards, DFW municipal governments select setbacks, which range from 300 to 1500 feet (91.4 to 457.2 m). Determining setbacks entails compromise between what citizens and policymakers perceive or tolerate as 'safe' versus a (1) In June 2015, the Texas state government passed House Bill 40 preempting many municipal regulatory powers over oil and gas. The bill was written by oil and gas industry lawyers (HeinkelWolfe, 2015) and was in response to the November 2014 City of Denton voters' ban on hydraulic fracturing. At the time of writing, it is unclear how much authority remains in cities, although setback distances are allowed. distance that might hamper hydrocarbon extraction and invite regulatory takings lawsuits. Finding that balance is complicated for three reasons: (1) the absence of legal precedent defining what constitutes an unreasonable setback distance open to 'takings' lawsuits, (2) a deeply polarized public debate about fracking's costs and benefits; and (3) limited empirical, peer-reviewed studies published before 2012 on health, environmental, and economic impacts of fracking.
Shale gas and Dallas
Dallas, founded as a trading post in 1841, developed into a regional economic hub for wheat and cotton distribution. Its importance as a rail (and later, air) junction caused growth in commerce, manufacturing, and finance sectors. Although there were few local oil wells, in the 1920-1930s Dallas became headquarters for many oil firms, especially after the discovery of large oil fields in East Texas (Graff, 2008) . Oil financing, legal services, transportation, equipment, and distribution-but not production or refining-located in Dallas (Lyons and Luker, 1998) . Indeed, oil and gas were never dominant industries in Dallas (Miller and Johnson, 1990) . Today, direct employment in natural resources and mining accounts for only ~5% of the labor force (City of Dallas, 2014c). The characterization of Dallas as an oil town, therefore, is largely due to popular media (Graff, 2008) .
The story of 'frack free' Dallas begins in 2006, when the DFW International Airport negotiated a $181 million contract and 25% royalty payments with Chesapeake Energy (Figure 2 ). Although the majority of profits remained at the airport, as a joint owner, the City of Dallas received approximately $1 million (City of Dallas, 2014b) . This windfall came during a projected $90 million city budget shortfall (City of Dallas, 2014a), prompting examination of shale gas extraction on city-owned mineral property as a potential revenue source.
In September 2006, the city's Economic Development Committee estimated royalties amounting to over $2 million per well for seven city-owned mineral properties. Although a 1958 mining ordinance nominally regulated subsurface extraction activities, it was inadequate for addressing unconventional gas extraction. From September 2006 to July 2007, the Economic Development Committee, the Transportation and Environment Committee, the Zoning Ordinance Advisory Committee (ZOC), the city attorney's office, and the City Plan Commission (CPC) worked together to draft a new ordinance (Figure 2 ). These groups met on eight occasions and consulted approximately 10 ordinances from neighboring municipalities, including Fort Worth, Irving, Arlington, North Richland Hills, and Southlake (Figure 1 ). The proposed ordinance included the Special Use Permit (SUP) regulatory procedure in which the city treated oil and gas well permit applications as zoning modifications requiring city council approval (SUPs eventually became integral to the city's gas drilling regulatory strategy) and a 300 foot (91.4 m) minimum setback distance from residences (City of Dallas, 2014b). The CPC and ZOC also consulted with industry leaders, the RRC, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and staff members from neighboring municipalities (City of Dallas, 2012 Dallas, , 2014a . Only one citizen voiced an opinion (favoring the proposed ordinance) during the CPC's final session in 2007.
A public commenting period also was held before the city council's vote on the proposed drilling ordinance. Of four speakers, two industry representatives, from ExxonMobil and Harding Company, strongly supported the ordinance. The council approved the ordinance with an eleven-to-one vote (Figure 2) . Later, it ratified a budget that incorporated over $20 million in projected revenues from signing bonuses and royalties (City of Dallas, 2014b). In fall 2008, the city approved SUPs for Trinity East Energy and received approximately $19 million in signing bonuses (City of Dallas, 2012) . Signing bonuses depend on the number of leased acres at a pre-determined dollar amount per acre. Bonuses were particularly large in 2008 because of high natural gas prices.
However, within months of approving the Trinity East Energy SUPs, natural gas prices plummeted-from $10.72 per thousand cubic feet in July 2008 to $3.45 a year later (Figure 2 ; EIA, 2014). Given these circumstances, operators with Dallas mineral leases and approved SUPs-specifically XTO Energy, Dale Resources, Chesapeake, and Trinity Eastdecided not to exercise their drilling rights (City of Dallas, 2012).
The Dallas gas drilling ordinance: mobilized and mutated
While decreased natural gas prices slowed drilling across the entire Barnett after 2010, citizen skepticism toward hydrocarbon companies was growing. At first, residents seemed content with shale gas drilling, but as the nuisances and negative effects (e.g. noise, truck traffic, and emissions) increased, people became more negatively disposed towards it (Theodori, 2012) . Local anti-fracking groups began to mobilize and denounce industry practices. DFW activists generally avoided attempts to 'federalize' governance and did not look to the EPA to trump the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ; Rahm, 2011) . Indeed, rather than federalize, as Davis and Hoffer (2012) predict, people opposed to fracking in Dallas and nearby municipalities 'localized' or 'municipalized' governance. In Dallas, citizen discontent focused on the existing drilling policy, particularly fracking in residential neighborhoods.
In spring 2011, the Dallas city council revisited their gas ordinance after postponing a renewal of an XTO Energy SUP (Hundley, 2011) . Several issues were discussed including: results from recent studies, the status of approved and pending drilling SUPs, and how to institute a temporary city-wide drilling moratorium until passage of an updated ordinance. In addition, the city manager reviewed regulatory modification procedures utilized by other DFW municipalities including task forces and expert consultations (City of Dallas, 2014a). Like other mobile policy examples (Cook, 2008) , the Dallas drilling policy began when discontent with the original policy instigated a search for a new policy.
Dallas gas drilling task force
For the updated policy, the Dallas city council created a task force that would suggest modifications to the 2007 ordinance. Although the origin of the inspiration for the Dallas task force is unclear, gas-drilling task forces were used in other regional municipalities, including Fort Worth, Flower Mound, and Denton (see below). Eight Dallas council members vetted 67 candidates through applications and interviews for the 11-member task force (City of Dallas, 2011) .
From July to October 2011, industry consultants, TCEQ, EPA, RRC, local environmental groups, and neighboring municipal representatives -including Southlake, Grand Prairie, Hurst, and Fort Worth (Figure 1) -briefed the task force. The task force also visited active drilling sites and held public hearings. After these consultations, the group deliberated for five months evaluated other municipal ordinances and considered the optimal procedures for drilling in Dallas (City of Dallas, 2012) .
During task force deliberations, members referenced or copied nearby municipal oil and gas ordinances. Few of the final recommendations originated with the task force (Table 1 ; City of Dallas, 2012). For example, the task force chose Grand Prairie's 1000 foot (304.8 m) setback distance and justified it with a real estate study commissioned by Flower Mound. This process closely resembles Cook's (2008) description of policies from elsewhere evaluated on their apparent success and appropriateness, or what McCann (2011) calls sets of 'actionable ideas' used for learning and comparative practice. But the patchwork-quilt appearance of the task force's recommended ordinance indicates that many municipal ordinances were consulted, and that the evaluation process was both highly specific-because it focused on particular clauses-as well as spatially wide ranging, including many municipalities. Final task force recommendations were presented to the mayor and city council in May 2012 (Figure 2 ; City of Dallas, 2014a).
Policy entrepreneurs and ideological contexts
Popular discourses that inform public perceptions can also play important roles in municipal policy formation. In Dallas, pro-and anti-drilling narratives were referred to as the 'industry' and 'environmental' perspectives, respectively, and played important roles in establishing narrative frames. For example, after presenting the city council with task force recommendations, the chairperson noted that "neither the environmental nor industry were happy with [the task force] recommendations" (City of Dallas, 2012) . This declaration prompted newly elected Dallas mayor, Mike Rawlings, to arrange a separate session to listen to 30-min speeches from "a spokesperson for the environmental concerns" and "a voice for the industry", an act that made 'official' the two groups in apparent opposition. This represents a view conditioned by the wider ideological context (McCann and Ward, 2013) where environmental and industry perspectives on fracking are positioned as incompatible and contradictory (Davis, 2014; Hudgins and Poole, 2014) . The special session also provided for the legitimization of what Peck and Theodore (2010) call 'nomadic policy entrepreneurs' who "make a business out of abstracting certain elements, or 'lessons', from specific policy contexts, moulding them into a persuasive story" (173). This process was apparent when the Mayor opened the session in August 2012:
There were questions that some of us had from all the points of view, so we thought we would use this today to learn more. I asked Mr.
[Councilman] Kadane and Mr.
[Councilman] Griggs to pick at their free choice one individual that would articulate to sometimes seemingly opposing points-of-view, so we could listen to the sides. Obviously it's not every side…Mr. Griggs picked Terry Welch, thank you, and Mr. Kadane, Mr.
Ireland. I will say that Mr. Welch is speaking on behalf of the environmental and neighborhood groups and not in any other capacity...And Mr. Ireland is speaking for the business, excuse me, the industry focus… Terry Welch, an attorney who advises many DFW municipalities, specializes in state and local government law with a sub-specialty in land use and zoning. Welch also served as a member of the Dallas task force. In work he was preparing at the time, Welch (2013) felt that local governments should work to protect public health and safety, and because of "the intensity of the political pressures and public interest" (239) in gas drilling, local governments should learn from one another how to regulate drilling. In his speech, Welch noted several times the need to "err on the side of protecting public health," stipulating "when you make that balance, I would tip that scale on the public health side." During the lecture and several hours of councilmember questioning, Welch's main argument was that the 1000 foot (304.8 m) task force setback distance was too short, because the Flower Mound real estate study showed that property value depreciated to 1500 feet (457.2 m) from gas wells; therefore, he recommended extending the setback to 1500 feet with a 1000 foot minimum variance that required three-fourths of councilmembers to agree on a case-by-case basis, and prohibiting gas wells in floodplains and parklands (City of Dallas, 2014a).
Ed Ireland, an academic economist before becoming executive director of the industryfunded Barnett Shale Energy Education Council based in Fort Worth, spoke for the 'industry'. Ireland addresses citizen groups and municipal governments in DFW, and was also a member of Denton's gas drilling task force from 2011 to 2012 (see below). Ireland's 30-min lecture often referenced Fort Worth, which had an ordinance "that works…They have a track record of working while they allow drilling". Ireland approved of floodplain and parkland drilling, and advocated using Fort Worth's 600 foot (182.8 m) setback that allowed the city to realize substantial financial benefits from royalties, interest, and signing bonuses for leasing cityowned mineral properties. To him, Fort Worth's setback allowed mineral owners to benefit from drilling, so the same setback would allow Dallas to "enjoy the economic benefits of their mineral rights without having to give up health and safety". The designation of Welch and Ireland as spokespersons for 'environmental' and 'industry' perspectives, respectively, demonstrates the need for familiar labels to give meaning and impact to their opinions. As representatives for idealized narrative frames, their policy recommendations fit preconceived binaries. That neither Welch nor Ireland necessarily fit their designated labels -one specializes in municipal law and the other energy economicswas not important. Instead, discursive frames worked to "focus thinking on certain definitions of what the key local governance problems are and also direct attention to a specific realm of possibility in which solutions might be sought or constructed" (Temenos and McCann, 2012: 1393) . Instead of 'urban planning' and 'worker safety,' or 'public health' and 'neighborhood quality,' for example, Dallas fit Welch and Ireland into previously established categories.
Dominant policy models
The 1500 and 600 foot (457.2 and 182.8 m) setback distances also represent two dominant setback models that originated in the Town of Flower Mound and the City of Fort Worth, respectively. As Peck and Theodore (2010) argue, it is important to consider the original policy models from which mobile policies mutate, morph, and evolve.
In December 2001, Fort Worth became one of the first DFW municipalities to adopt a gas-drilling ordinance in the fracking era (Figure 2 ). It also was one of the first municipalities with urban drilling. Fort Worth's original ordinance had a 300 foot (91.4 m) setback distance. Key city officials had experience with the oil industry and, because of financial opportunities, were eager to allow drilling within city territory. However, in 2006, largely responding to citizen complaints of noise and proximity, Fort Worth created a task force composed of industry and neighborhood representatives (see below), amended their ordinance, and set a 600 foot setback. In 2014, the city had over 1990 producing wells and over $200 million in revenues from leasing city-owned mineral properties (City of Fort Worth, 2014).
The Town of Flower Mound passed its first oil and gas ordinance in May 2003 (Figure 2 ). But citizen complaints from noise and light pollution motivated city officials to amend the ordinance in 2005 and again in 2007, when a 1000 foot (304.8 m) setback distance was instituted. Before 2008, most gas wells were in less populated areas. However, that year a gas well drilled and fracked in a residential neighborhood prompted complaints and motivated citizen activism. In response, the town council issued a drilling moratorium and commissioned studies to examine distance thresholds. One study found a link between gas wells and decreasing home property values, and identified a 1500 foot (457.2 m) threshold (Integra Realty Resources, 2010). In July 2011, the town council voted to amend their ordinance and instituted a 1500 foot setback. There is no drilling on town-owned mineral property today and only seven producing wells in Flower Mound.
An ordinance for the 'Dallas Way'
With the Ireland and Welch lectures completed, the Dallas city government moved into the ordinance-drafting phase. From 15 August 2012 to 3 April 2013, the City Council met at least five times in closed sessions with the city attorney to discuss gas drilling (City of Dallas, 2014a). On 26 September 2013, the City Plan Commission (CPC) proposed an ordinance that incorporated many task force recommendations with significant modifications, including a 1500 foot (457.2 m) setback that could be reduced to 1000 feet (304.8 m) through variance by a three-fourths council vote, more land uses subjected to the 1500 foot setback, and more stringent requirements for drilling in parks (City of Dallas, 2013). On 11 December 2013, the city council moved to vote on the recommended regulations. Immediately prior to the vote, 19 citizens voiced opinions, with most staunchly opposed to fracking. The final ordinance passed with a nine-to-six vote (City of Dallas, 2013 , 2014a .
Local and regional media immediately reported on the council's vote. The Dallas Morning News Metro headline for December 12 read 'Dallas Oks Gas Drilling Rules that are Among Nation's Tightest' (Loftis, 2013) , while the local National Public Radio station focused on reactions to the setback distance (Austin and Zeeble, 2013) . Many environmental groups declared victory; for example, the Texas Campaign for the Environment claimed the regulations were a "huge, huge step in the right direction" (Gillett, 2013) . Conversely, the Consumer Energy Alliance Texas, a statewide pro-drilling advocacy group, condemned the ordinance as a "de facto moratorium on drilling activities due to its unreasonable setback" (Sakelaris, 2013) , while the Independent Petroleum Association of America called the ordinance a strategy that "deceptively [calls] for 'rules' instead of a ban, when the hidden agenda is still a ban" (Baker, 2014) .
But the city's adoption of the restrictive ordinance came as no surprise to local political observers who had long referred to the city's distinct policymaking process as 'the Dallas Way,' or what McCann and Ward (2013: 9) would describe as the importance of 'institutional context' in conditioning policy mobilities. Once a derogatory term used to describe a disconnected, oligarchical municipal government, the 'Dallas Way' term now refers to the city's perceived unique (to Texas) institutional structure. To Graff (2008) , 'the Dallas Way' highlights a bureaucratic culture that embraces opposing perspectives and allows frequent citizen input into local decisions. This "urban legacy…[of] fairness, cooperation, and greater attention to human services" (Hill, 1996: 173) became part of the city's institutional structure. It appeared in the oil and gas ordinance debates when citizens interacted with and influenced policymakers. Moreover, the Special Use Permit (SUP) process-authorizations approved on a case-by-case basis-is a 'Dallas Way' for managing gas drilling-related zoning concerns.
The institutional context in Dallas in 2007 was as important as it was to the 2013 amended ordinance. During the 2007 budget crisis, Dallas opted for minimal regulations and a 300 foot setback distance that optimized royalties over regulations. Prospects for extremely large signing bonuses made the 'Dallas Way' expendable, drawing criticism from councilperson Angela Hunt, who was "tired of our city whoring itself out for a few measly bucks" by adopting an ordinance without citizen input (Hunt, 2008) . But six years later, with more peerreviewed research available, more restrictive ordinances in use by nearby municipalities, and more citizen experiences with drilling, the public's mood turned against drilling. In 2013, when it came to choosing between the two dominant setback models from Fort Worth and Flower Mound respectively, city officials opted for the latter. Moreover, given that there is no drilling in Dallas today, and little drilling in Flower Mound, the ordinance and its 1500 foot (457.2 m) setback conform to what Peck and Theodore (2012: 171) call the "expectations of comparable results of policy implementation".
After the new ordinance went into effect, Trinity East Energy filed a claim against the City of Dallas for alleged fraud, breach of contract, and negligence for rejecting their permit renewals after accepting $19 million in bonus payments (Malewitz, 2014) . A trial date is set for November 2015. Otherwise, no other lawsuits, including regulatory takings, have yet been brought against the city. This could be because only portions of Dallas overlie the Barnett and operators focused their attention elsewhere. Likewise, rather than appeal to courts, the oil and gas industry and mineral owners eventually took their case to the Texas State Legislature. A June 2015 state law may nullify many powers Texas municipalities once used to regulate drilling. Effects on Dallas, however, may be minimal due to the city's small reserves and because most available drilling land is city-owned, which means the city would need to agree to lease city-owned minerals, thereby exposing their drilling ordinance to possible legal challenges from the state government.
To review, the Dallas case indicates how some urban drilling policies are mobile. Municipal oil and gas drilling ordinances do not diffuse from one city to the next by rational policymakers scanning the policy landscape and choosing the 'best' policy (see Peck, 2011) . Instead, drilling ordinances move in bits and pieces, are promoted by policy consultants, motivated by local conditions, and are mutated to fit the local context. Sharing, mutating, and morphing policies seen in DFW gas ordinances also suggest that regionally specific municipal regulations and other environmental and regulatory policies are mobile.
Explaining hydrocarbon policy mobility
The Dallas case highlights broader urban hydrocarbon governance dynamics that explain why drilling regulations mobilize. First, among DFW municipalities, gas drilling task forces are common governance strategies with anti-political undertones that help render setbacks 'technical.' Second, the legal and institutional separation of mineral property estates creates unique governance conditions for cities, including discursive threats of regulatory takings lawsuits. Copying and molding policy provisions provides municipal policymakers a bureaucratic solution to these legal uncertainties. Third, the ability of policymakers to choose among different setback options, which impose varying degrees of constraints on hydrocarbon industry accumulation, suggests that setback polemics are sites of contestation over space.
Degrees of anti-politics and rendering setbacks technical
Task forces, common components of municipal hydrocarbon governance processes, are instruments of anti-political strategies that create the space for policy mobility under specific hydrocarbon institutions. Elected officials use task forces to remove from the public domain aspects of the policymaking process. Ostensibly comprised of specialized and expert knowledge but not always including local citizens, task forces help disguise the political nature of copied and mutated municipal hydrocarbon policies by recasting governing activities "as nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions" (Ong, 2006: 10) . Setback distances are examples of technical solutions to the political, ideological, and other problems associated with urban drilling. Space does not permit a full comparison of DFW task forces, but the four highlighted in Figure 3 vary by members involved, interests and specializations represented, and final setback recommendations, suggesting different degrees of anti-politics.
In terms of outcome, the Dallas task force was most like Flower Mound, but in terms of 'expert' composition it was most like Denton and Fort Worth (Figure 3 ). Property owners (including three mineral owners) without discernable 'expert' qualifications comprise the majority of Flower Mound's task force. In Fort Worth, some resident representatives (appointed by council members with connections to the oil and gas industry) were accused of being 'industry people' who overrode the voting power of task force members concerned about urban drilling (Prince, 2006) . In Denton, task force members purportedly represented "the best interest of all stakeholders -citizens, energy industry, and the City" and were chosen based on "specialized knowledge in the environmental, gas, engineering, and legal industries" (City of Denton, 2010). However, citizens complained that the group was stacked in industry's favor, which resulted in repeated "3-2 votes to kill stricter rules for noise, well casings, public notification and other industry activities" (Brown, 2012) . Both Denton and Fort Worth task forces appear to have been organized to keep regulations and setback distances at a minimum. In each case, citizens also were dissatisfied with an anti-political decisionmaking process that occurred outside the public domain and beyond their democratic control (see Clarke, 2015) .
The purpose of including 'experts' on task forces is to render setback distances and other recommendations 'technical'. Like development practitioners, task force member "expertise depends on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solutions that fall within their repertoire" (Li, 2007: 7) . This was apparent in the Dallas task force where the larger number of lawyers directed discussions towards legal technicalities, even as language and provisions were selectively copied. By reposing political questions as technical "problems responsive to technical intervention" (Ferguson, 1994: 270) , task forces render technical the multiple issues associated with urban drilling and fracking-and the solutions to those issues-to one setback distance. 'Technical' setbacks work to reduce "the domain to be governed as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics" (Li, 2007; Rose, 1999: 33) .
The irony here is that rendering technical also confers expertise (Li, 2007) , so that task forces are not merely spaces where 'experts' convene, but spaces where they acquire legitimacy. In fact, few can claim expertise on all facets of fracking and shale gas development, especially given the high degree of technological complexity (Chew, 2014) , uncertainty about health and environmental risks (Jackson et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2014) , lack of legal precedent, and newness of fracking in urban areas. For this reason, the Dallas task force final recommendations were not outcomes of experts' discoveries, but consisted of language and provisions that were lifted, reorganized, and fit to Dallas conditions and expectations. Although expertise was a supposed prerequisite for membership on the task force, participation bestowed expertise. Apparent task force expertise, in turn, allows cities to justify setbacks as technical.
The mineral estate institution and regulatory takings threats
The separation of mineral and surface estates, and judicial matters arising, creates fundamental conditions for capital accumulation from hydrocarbons that encourage anti-political behavior and policy mobility among municipalities. Because no legal precedent exists, it remains unclear what setback distance would constitute a regulatory takings (Welch, 2013) . Mineral owners and hydrocarbon firms use veiled or direct threats of regulatory takings lawsuits to resource-limited and lawsuit-averse city staff and elected officials; these threats function as anti-political strategies and discursive regulatory tools that keep setbacks at a minimum and reduce the regulatory authority of municipalities. Takings threats are anti-political because they work to replace politics -collective decision making about access -while phrased as technical legal problems. Discursive threats of lawsuits also function like other 'modes of regulation' (Tickell and Peck, 1995) to limit government regulations and establish setback distances that the hydrocarbon industry would consider 'reasonable,' thereby maintaining accumulation for hydrocarbon firms. For example, Ed Ireland warned that "overly restrictive drilling ordinances is a confiscation of property of mineral owners" (City of Dallas, 2014a), reflecting the contention that long setbacks are open to compensatory regulatory takings claims.
The coercive effect of these threats is reflected in comments by Dallas city officials before the final vote in December 2013. Councilman Jerry Allen asked, "Maybe if we do get these lawsuits that come in the form of taking away mineral rights and such I wonder where that money [to defend the city] is going to come from?" and suggested recreational center and swimming pool budgets would be sacrificed to pay legal fees. Councilman Sheffie Kadane opposed "[taking] away the opportunity for our mineral owners to not get their constitutional right and sell their minerals." Terry Welch cautioned the Dallas city council about overemphasizing takings claims, arguing that a court would balance public health and safety with property rights (City of Dallas, 2014a). Although Welch also cautioned against 'arbitrary' setback distances, he could not identify what setback distance constituted a regulatory takings because of poorly defined Texas case law. Lawsuit-averse municipalities therefore avoid 'takings' challenges by evaluating other ordinances and copying those provisions that are least likely to attract lawsuits. The vertical partition of mineral and surface property motivates regulatory solutions to emergent contradictions between the mineral owner, who must use surface land to gain access to hydrocarbons, and the surface owner, who must acquiesce to the mineral owner.
Contesting neoliberalism
The governance processes revealed by the Dallas case indicate that setback distance regulations represent a type of contestation of neoliberalism situated between complete deregulation and overt opposition. Opposition of neoliberalism would push for longer distances that would limit hydrocarbon firm capital accumulation and possibly challenge hydrocarbon institutions. Task forces and policy mutation find important roles among municipal policymakers, especially because of uncertainties regarding hydraulic fracturing. This creates a process of dialogue and contestation among varied groups and individuals, resembling the idea that there is "no ideal-typical notion of end-stage neoliberalism" (Brenner et al., 2010: 209) . DFW municipal setbacks are located within a form of neoliberal governance in which 300 and 1500 feet (91.4 and 457.2 m) are at the outer limits of an area that anti-political strategies may contain. Ed Ireland's testimony indicates that hydrocarbon firms will accept (reluctantly) 600 feet (182.8 m)-Fort Worth only adopted 600 foot setbacks after strong citizen backlashhighlighting that "neoliberalization must conform to some degree with social constructions of legality, ethics, and justice to maintain legitimacy" (Leitner et al., 2007: 10) .
It follows then that setbacks greater than 300 feet (91.4 m) can be considered forms of contestation against the neoliberal 'ideal,' with distances exceeding 600 feet (182.8 m) representing politically uncomfortable challenges to neoliberalism. This is why hydrocarbon interests characterize 1500 foot (457.2 m) setbacks as 'drilling bans' that challenge neoliberal norms in the present institutional context that encourages capital and hydrocarbon accumulation. The different setbacks used by Dallas and nearby municipalities demonstrate the sociospatial nature of the reciprocal interdependence of neoliberalization and contestation of neoliberalism, where "space is simultaneously an object of contestation and part and parcel of political strategy" (Leitner et al., 2007: 19) . In other words, setback distances that define the space around gas wells, and ultimately determine drilling density and intensity within a municipality, facilitate a conflict between competing 'anti-regulation' and 'antidrilling' interests. Municipal government solutions to this conflict include rendering setbacks technical through anti-political strategies and mobilizing and morphing policy provisions from neighboring municipalities.
Conclusion
Anti-political practices and hydrocarbon institutions help explain why the Dallas city staff and task force selectively copied, mutated, and morphed language and models from other municipal oil and gas ordinances. Although policy consultants, discursive frames that fit the wider ideological context, dominant policy models, and a local institutional context influenced the final gas drilling ordinance and 1500 foot (457.2 m) setback distance, antipolitical practices and strategies were necessary because an institutionalized mineral estate created legal uncertainty over what constituted a regulatory takings. That is, policy mobilities facilitated the making of the final ordinance, while anti-politics lay beneath the setback's justification.
The Dallas case reveals that task force composition and decision-making has anti-political potential and that task forces work to render the multiple issues surrounding urban gas drilling in technical terms, what Li (2007) calls a subliminal and routine form of anti-politics. Setback distances in DFW municipalities, mobilized and mutated from other municipalities, not only arose from convergence of citizen and councilperson concerns about residents' health, safety, and welfare, but also took into consideration the anti-political 'threats' arising from legal claims of regulatory takings and potential to affect capital accumulation from hydrocarbons. In this way, anti-politics and the mineral estate institution explain neoliberal hydrocarbon governance at municipal scales of decision making where degrees of neoliberal contestation characterize processes that locate setback distances between 300 and 1500 feet (91.4 and 457.2 m).
By pushing neoliberal contestation to the 1500 foot (457.2 m) setback distance, Dallas bucked its popular image and, for all practical purposes, became 'frack free'. Tellingly, oil and gas firms did not make an organized response to the city's adoption of the 1500 foot setback because, in colloquial terms, they lived to fight another day, turning to state lawmakers instead of city council members. With new state-level 'preemption' legislation, written by oil and gas attorneys (Heinkel-Wolfe, 2015) , the oil and gas industry aims to ensure that cities will not repeat the policies of Dallas and other cities. The ultimate irony, then, is that hydrocarbon firms that claim to desire a neoliberal policy environment successfully relocated the locus of regulatory oversight from municipal governments to the state government-which can be lobbied more efficiently and has preexisting ties to the industry (Warner and Shapiro, 2013 )-but only after considerable policy mutation, anti-political practice, and discursive threats regarding 'takings' that occurred at municipal scales of government.
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